(SMARANDA VULTUR in "22" magazine, no. 876, 19-25 December 2006)
A starting point
According to the official party documents, the founding of the Domașnea Collective Agricultural Farm (GAC) was a new victory won by the Romanian people led by the Romanian Workers' Party, "a victory of historic significance on the road to completing the building of socialism", as the documents of the time put it. In May 1963, only a year after the GAC was founded, the reports and minutes of the meetings of the Executive Committee of the People's Council speak of intense, enthusiastic work to put into practice the great objectives set (by the party, of course, through directives). Some of these concern the figures of the production plan, others aims harder to measure, such as "the development of socialist consciousness".
It is no longer a question, as in the 1950s, of a fierce struggle against the class enemy. The rhetoric of official discourse had swapped the outlook of war with the enemy within for a glorifying one, closer to what we knew until the last years of the communist regime, under Ceaușescu. In the 1960s realities appear wrapped in a new coating, less shocking and more attractive. The emphasis seems to shift from repression to persuasion and encouragement. The party also tries to dress up its language: so, instead of "persuasion work", a report of 1959, just when this work was being carried out most intensely in Domașnea, uses the formula "commission for speeding up the pace of the socialist transformation of agriculture"(!!).
If we turn to the collection of secret documents I consulted, on the one hand, and to the testimony of direct participants in collectivisation, on the other (I interviewed 14 people; next to each quotation I will give only the number of the interview), the situation in the commune of Domașnea stands in enormous contrast to the reassuring claims of official discourse.
The files I consulted show the role the Securitate played in Romania in 1957-1966, how information circulated, what it contained, and how the Securitate related to the party. Under cover of the secrecy of the documents it produced, it practically never abandoned the logic of class struggle and of war against internal enemies, whom, when it could not always find and identify them, it invented, using a "documentation" process meant to confirm that each case fitted the identikit of the "hostile element".
If we follow the "informative notes" on "negative aspects" and on "the state of mind" of the members of the collective farm in Domașnea over the period covered by files FD I and FD II, we see them travel up the hierarchy from Comrade Valeriu Ivan, the operative officer responsible for local information, to the district section, and from there, through Captain Timircan (already promoted to major by 1965), to the regional directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI). Some of the informative notes the district section of the MAI sent to the regional directorate were also sent "for information" to the party bodies at the same level, "so that the proper measures could be taken by this route too". At a certain point the Militia also became involved in the exchange of information with the Securitate, sending reports to it through its representatives at various levels.
The "state of mind", constantly watched, is most often "unsatisfactory" or even "agitated", and the "negative aspects" concern the discontent or comments of the peasants or others under watch, sometimes quoted (keeping some dialect features, popular expressions or features of speech), sometimes summarised.
Comrade Ivan worked on the spot with a network of agents. I tried to talk to one of the people recorded in the file as part of this network, but this person admits to no involvement and says they do not know who Comrade Ivan, the operative officer, was, because they were not a party member(!?). Only the postman remembers him spontaneously during the interview and refers to his actions, although nearly everyone talks about the Securitate. Defining it globally, without being able to tie it to specific individuals, is a constant in the witnesses' accounts, which is ultimately natural, given how the institution worked.
Some of those interviewed who did have dealings with it describe the experience. The documents in FD II include several interrogation records and "pledges" which those questioned were forced to write, sometimes in their own hand, and to sign. These pledges stated precisely that the persons concerned would say nothing to anyone about their time at the Securitate, accepting the legal consequences otherwise. They also pledged not to "denigrate" the collective farm any more and not to act against it. Mainly, those who ended up under Securitate investigation in 1963, the year these documents date from, were those who had wanted to leave the collective farm, sometimes repeatedly, or had tried to draw others into doing so. Some of them had been under the Securitate's watch for a long time, as shown by a "nominal table of certain elements who have carried out and are carrying out hostile activity against the GAC", a table listing 29 people (cf. FD II, f. 178-184). Some of those I interviewed appear on this list. Some of them were asked, as the pledges show, not only to stop acting against the collective farm but also "to carry out persuasion work with those who still try to submit requests to leave the collective" (FD II, f. 177) or, worse, "to unmask those elements who spread propaganda in the village for leaving the GAC and to denounce them to the state bodies" (cf. FD II, f. 176).
Among the "hostile elements" were "Legionnaires, members of the National Peasant Party and the National Liberal Party, as well as other hostile elements of other categories, who use the most perfidious and camouflaged methods to hinder the process of the socialist transformation of agriculture" (FD II, f. 63).
Since there was no doubt about the hostile character of the elements "slipped into the GAC" or of the subversives, given their political past, the regional Securitate directorate asked those in the field to present "the proving documents" or to gather evidence, so that "urgent measures of qualified informative coverage" could be taken (FD II, f. 58).
In the period before the association (întovărășire) or the collective farm, the emphasis falls on how those targeted "influenced" the inhabitants of Domașnea not to join the collective farm. How did they do this? "Through rumours, discrediting the GAC and the associations, and when these had no effect, through more open actions, such as threats or direct opposition to the measures taken by the Party and the Government" (FD II, f. 63). As can be seen, in the eyes of the Securitate and from the standpoint of power, speaking critically about certain things, threatening and taking action were all part of the same act of rebellion.
People gathering in groups of more than 10 could also give rise to the presumption that they were together there (for example, in a fellow villager's house) "to discuss the founding of the association", or rather "hostilely, against its founding", a conclusion drawn merely because they had "fallen silent when the party activist appeared and refused to talk to him" (FD II, f. 58).
A report of February 1960 states that "in the commune of Domașnea and the village of Cănicea, the wives of some hostile elements sought to instigate (to intrigue!, the document actually says) certain peasants not to join the agricultural associations" (FD II, f. 91). Examples follow, each stating what the "hostile action" consisted of. One of the "instigators" had already drawn attention before this episode, since, according to the Securitate's findings, she "was sentenced to 6 months for not handing over her quotas and for threatening the local bodies (the People's Council), and her husband was sentenced to 4 years for links with the terrorist bands" (the fugitives in the mountains) (FD II, f. 91). This is not the only time women come to the fore.
The Securitate's "documentation"
The oldest data in the file, few in number, date from 1957 and concern the situation in the newly founded associations in the Orșova district. Enrolment was going badly then and later too, and in Domașnea this was put down to "hostile elements who had links with the fugitives in the mountains". Since this time it concerned party members, suspected moreover of having been Legionnaires in the past, the Timișoara Regional Directorate of the MAI asked the district Securitate section (FD I, f. 58), on the one hand, to gather "proving evidence" against them and to place them under "informative coverage", and on the other, to inform the district party committee so that they could be expelled.
As noted, the fact that they were "hostile elements" had already been established, and the Securitate could recommend their expulsion from the party, while insisting on the need to prove the incriminating facts (it appears that at least one of the people targeted by the report had already been through interrogations, but these data did not seem sufficient or conclusive). As order no. 312/12.616 of 31 January 1958 shows, "documentation" could also include "identifying the persons who know about them and who can be questioned, without, however, violating popular legality"(?!).
The picture of "hostile actions" grew more varied over time, and the enemies identified were no longer limited to those from the former political parties or those with links to the "bandits" in the mountains.
In Cornereva, for example, the Orthodox priest of the commune came under watch, given his influence over the community, as did a preacher of the Lord's Army (report of the district Securitate section to the MAI Regional Directorate in Timișoara, no. 322 of 23 January 1958), who interpreted passages from the Bible "tendentiously", in the sense of influencing the villagers not to join the association.
In Domașnea the pressure aimed ultimately at turning the association into a collective farm. Persuasion, intimidation and surveillance went hand in hand. The range of what could be counted as action against the collective farm or the association was quite wide and unpredictable.
L.P. (interview 5), who had 32 first cousins, advised them all not to join. He says he carried out counter-propaganda among his neighbours and friends too, and admits that he was threatened by the Securitate with arrest and confined to his home until the collective was inaugurated, especially as he was among the few who in the end did not join the collective farm. His "hostile activity" continued after the collective farm was founded, and there is a trace in FD II of his passing through a Securitate investigation in 1963. Under investigation he was forced, like the others questioned in the same batch, to sign a pledge that he would not tell anyone he had been questioned. This was probably why he did not mention the pledge, although it did not include denouncing others, only stopping his own propaganda against the collective farm.
"There was a lot of squeezing before they put the halter on our heads, that's how it was," one interviewee (14) remarked. She herself ended up under Securitate investigation because, after the collective farm was founded and she had joined under pressure, at one point she wanted to leave. Her testimony focuses almost entirely on her encounter with the Securitate, and what she stresses most is how she was intimidated and humiliated:
"...I kept saying, how can I join the collective, how can I work, with two small children? I had one in the cradle and one a bit bigger, he was five. And I had a husband with one arm. And when they came, that's what I told them. They came at night and took me away. (Who?) The Militia, the people from the council. (From here?) Yes, from the council. And they took me and carried me off to Orșova. Believe me if you can, they stripped me like a little child, and they took my papers, the ones from the dead. They talked me over. (Did they beat you too?) No, they didn't beat me, only every two hours they brought me in to ask whether I'd work in the collective, then they'd let me go. I told them, I'll work, yes, of course I'll work, only how can I go with these little children? And I had to put my husband's shoes on for him. And then what can I say, they kept at me like that till evening, kept taking me away and bringing me back. One evening they took me again, and I heard the doors open there. God sent them. And when they saw me so shaken, they could only see my blouse and my skirt. And I was holding on to my skirt so it wouldn't fall down. They said: 'What about this woman, what crime has she done?' And I burst into tears, but I didn't dare look to see who it was. They stood in front of me and asked: 'What's the matter with you?' I told them I had a husband with no arm, from the war, and two small children. He said: 'Well, write down that she's not fit for work. Don't cry any more!' And straight away they rang and brought me my clothes, and I got dressed. They told me to go to the station. I said: 'How can I go to the station when I've no money for the train?' And one of them gave me money for the train and one gave me bread and some soft cheese. I didn't want to take it, but they said: 'How can you go to your children like this, when they'll ask, Mummy, what have you brought us?!' And I went to the station, and there were a lot of people there, and suddenly I felt someone take me by the shoulder like this, and I saw it was one of them, and they bought me a ticket and I came home. (Who were they? Do you know them?) No, I don't know them, but they were well-dressed people, decent people, educated people. (...) (Were you afraid?) Well, how could you not be afraid? (And the ones who took you away, were they from the village?) Yes, from the village, but he croaked; the bad illness took him and he died, he died with his wife, and the child sold the house and he's a wreck. God didn't spare them."
I noticed that two themes often appear in accounts of this kind: the appearance of a saviour, a piece of staging the Securitate used, as prison testimonies show, to confuse the person being questioned; and the belief that things are set right again by divine punishment of the one who did wrong.
In Domașnea the association was not dissolved in 1962, as it was in all the surrounding villages and communes. The witnesses tend to attribute this to the zeal of some local officials, one of whom is most often demonised. This is the activist Toma, deputy secretary of the district, of whom someone recounts that in the morning, between 7.30 and 8, exactly when the children had to go to school, he would shoot at buckets filled with water, for practice but certainly also to intimidate. Meanwhile, those living in the same yard were confined to the house until the morning exercise was over.
For others his presence in the village had direct consequences. Here is what someone remembers (interview 8):
"We didn't want to join the association, because I also had two little sisters and I couldn't sign up for them, because our father had died. (You held the land together?) Yes, I held the land together with them. And then they kept coming and persecuting us. And then my husband went to the machine and tractor station in Caransebeș, because he worked at Zăgujeni; he didn't come home for two months, and I stayed here and they arrested me... Comrade Toma. (Was he a party activist?) Yes, the party activist. (And what year did they arrest you?) In '58. He arrested me and kept me 48 hours without food or sleep and put me here in the People's Council, where the shops are now, to chop wood because I wouldn't join the association. Then my eldest child came and cried at the door with my mother and said, 'Come on, Mummy, sign up!' They cursed us too, they swore at us too, they beat us too. (Was it just him, or were there more?) There was the Militia too, and another party activist, but I didn't know him. But Toma I knew... he persecuted us the most. And then from the commune there was one Florica Oroane. And then there was Ion Răduța, who also persecuted us to the bone. (What did he do?) He'd make us go with the cart for compulsory labour at night; he'd get us up at two to go to the station and fetch flour, because he had shops at the cooperatives. At night, through the snow, he'd make us go with the cart to haul flour."
These are not the only troubles the collective brought into their lives, nor the only abuses they suffered:
"We handed over carts with two horses, a harrow, a plough, a maize planter. I came home with just the halter and the whip, and on my word I came home crying, because I gave up young horses, a three-year-old mare and a five-year-old horse; I handed them over at the Council. A year later they took them and brought them here and sold them round the villages, in Rusca, at Oraca, and they took the money."
Toma's abuses are also mentioned in a Securitate report of 1965, which says he had food brought by car from Herculane for himself and for those with whom he quite often went on binges.
"He (Toma, editor's note) sat at headquarters and spread us out, and in the evening, the review. Each of us had a number of houses, a sector. (How many of these commissions were there?) Oh, I think there were about 20. (And how many in a commission?) Four or five. To instruct people that the collective farm is good. They even gave us lessons. They'd bring an agronomist who'd show us on the blackboard that it produces so much wheat, but they were astronomical figures; we, who knew the facts, knew, but what could you do? (You realised it wasn't so?) Well, we realised, but what could you do... (Did you know others who already had a collective farm?) We knew, because we had connections in Timișoara, in Oltenia; we knew how people lived on the collective farm, plus those who'd been at the front in Russia knew what a kolkhoz means. One of them, Petru Românu, ran off and became a partisan because of it, and he said it wasn't good. Plus there were many old people who told what a kolkhoz means. (...)
And they divided us into sectors. They came to everyone, and the verdict was: 'Either you join the collective or we throw your child out of university' (...) Another method was through jobs. They'd send people home and tell them: 'I won't take you back at work until you bring a certificate that you've joined the collective farm.' Another method, since many had been convicted politically and had done prison, was to tell them: 'What do you want, are you setting yourself against the state? Do you want me to put you in prison again?' The Securitate was here; many resisted, and they'd come in the evening by car, take them all the way to Orșova and hold them for a day, and in the evening send them back. I don't know whether they beat them or not, but they took them for a ride." (interview 9)
Those who got to the apple pot
Gradually, the divide between "them" (the power) and "us" (the victims) appeared within the community itself. Those who "got to the apple pot", as some put it, were seen by the others as a kind of corrupt and cynical gang.
Here is how a peasant, a war veteran who also drew the attention of the Securitate, describes the events of those years (interview 6):
"Collectivisation began by force. A gang of people formed it, whether they got something from the state, from the state leadership, or were forced. With some people they found all sorts of reasons: you did this, you did that. So people, what could they do, joined the collective. But some 40 families didn't join.
And they made fools of these people: you worked a summer's day for nothing, because they didn't give you a single coin per workday. Not even a 5-bani coin did they give you. You went out to the field with your bag of food and came home with nothing, because the Militia was there. (...) They made fools of us, as if we were nobody's tool... that's what communism was like. It's no use some saying it was good; those who say so are the ones who lived well, because under the communists it was good nowhere. But we know what it was like...
(Who lived well?) Well, their gang. They wouldn't even let you have the pasture, and they'd see to it that we were given bad land, good for nothing1, to wear you down somehow, so that in the end you'd give in, so you'd see there was no point any more. All day, morning and evening, we'd wake up with them in the room. (Did they come to you too?) Yes, 3 or 4 of them would come into the room and wouldn't leave. They'd tell us, 'Just sign,' and I'd tell him, 'I can't sign.' 'What do you mean you can't? You won't, because you're against the party, against us.'" (interview 6)
For some of those interviewed, the change the collective brought lay precisely in the division of the community, which also explains why the collective was good for some and not for others:
"(Do you think the collective changed the way people were?) Of course it did. (In what way?) Well, some were more protected, others weren't. (And were there conflicts?) No, there were no conflicts, but we could see who was more protected. Because those who stole by the cartload were protected. You don't go and steal a cartload of apples or a cartload of maize or plums at night. Of course you had an understanding with the police, with the team leader, with the president of the collective. (So that's how it worked, with understandings like that?) Yes, of course, because he didn't steal only for himself, he stole for them too; they shared it. (Did they share among themselves, or give to the bigger bosses too?) The big ones came and took rachie by the carload." (interview 10)
"That's what they said: 'Who stole with the motor, the district forgave; who stole with the sack, the devil took, and he did prison.' (Who made up these verses?) People in the village said them. Some worked and others took. That's how it was. And what they gave a person was nothing at all. Three people built themselves houses in Domașnea with my cart; they worked on the house, and then they took it and sold it. Woe and bitterness!" (interview 8). Conflicts and paradoxical situations of this kind also affected family life. Cases where one family member joined the communists, despite the persecution they inflicted on another member of the family, or perhaps precisely in the hope of saving something, were not rare.
Another interviewee (interview 2) shows that, although his maternal grandfather, a man of property, had set out precisely to develop the estate, he was forced to admit in the 1950s that he was out of step with the times. The excessive quotas, the "stabilisation" and being classed as a kulak gradually made it impossible for him to keep his land. Although he was "the main pawn in the family", as he puts it himself, the future team leader was forced to take a job to have money to pay the taxes. The family managed to split the land into three parts, so that instead of being registered with 15 ha, each generation appeared with only 5; the three families then also lived apart. The heavy pressure made every member of the family join the collective, and the grandson became a team leader. The maternal grandfather, who died shortly afterwards, summed up a situation which, even if he understood it, he could not accept easily or without regret: "Eh, son, they've bought you, these people have!"
The resistance
On the other side, the Securitate carried on, in the style already shown, its surveillance aimed at uncovering "hostile activity" and "the shortcomings shown in the socialist transformation of agriculture". The overall picture of these years shows how widespread the refusal to accept collectivisation was, and the growing worry of the authorities, whose surveillance and "informative processing" intensified. The number of agents in the countryside in the district had risen to 47, of whom 40 agents were "handed over to the residency"(!?).
This was the atmosphere in which the Domașnea collective farm was created on 8 April 1962.
Among the ways of refusing or postponing enrolment, people claimed that the property belonged to parents, in-laws or a family member who was temporarily away from home. In Cănicea people fled into the forest when the persuasion commissions came. But the winter of 1961-1962, the testimonies say, was a hard one, and fleeing to the forest was no longer possible. A number of "elements", to use the Securitate's expression, who had not joined the association joined the collective farm directly. They were also the first to give trouble both to the local authorities and to the Securitate, because, having sown their land before joining the collective farm, they asked to harvest their wheat individually.
Having been refused by the collective farm's management council, they wrote higher up, directly to the Supreme Council of Agriculture, which replied that they would receive approval from the regional Council. So 14 people went to Timișoara and won their case.
The regional Securitate demanded reports on "the state of mind" every 10 days (order cab. 736 of December 1959 and no. 320/11.532 of 13 July 1961). The fear was that the discontent might spread "without the causes of this discontent being known, or who stands at its head" (FD I, f. 335).
A first series of requests to leave the collective, addressed to the Supreme Council of Agriculture, was reported around 20 October 1962, a few months after the collective farm was founded, and it set off a wide-ranging "informative processing". The Securitate wanted to know how the collective farmers' action started, how the application form was obtained and who filled it in, and who the initiators were (cf. report no. 128.403 of 29 October 1962), and it learned through its agents that the peasants, warned that their letters would be held back at the post office (I saw one such intercepted letter in the file, and we also have the testimony of the postman of that time), were trying to send their letters from neighbouring communes. According to the informative notes, over 100 people wanted to leave, some making statements hostile not only to the collective farm but also to the party, which they called a thief, and foreseeing its fall from power, since people had grown poor and the state took everything from them. The collective farmers also discussed the international situation and referred to the 1956 revolution in Hungary. In this especially agitated context, the Securitate went to Domașnea and talked to those involved, noting the stubbornness and determination of some, who were later watched and questioned. FD II, f. 227-231 holds two interrogation records from the investigations carried out on 26-30 October 1962.
Despite the repression, a group of 17 people "went to Bucharest to complain about their requests to leave the collective farm and about having been questioned by the Securitate" (telephone note, bulletin no. 128752 of 20 November 1962).
The high point of the events that followed forced collectivisation, recorded in telephone note bulletin no. 128752 of 20 November 1962, was the revolt on the evening of 19 November 1962, which remained in the memory of many people of Domașnea (interviews 2, 10, 14). In Bucharest the petitioners had been promised that a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture would be sent to the village and a general meeting held so they could state their grievances. On the evening of 19 November 1962 the women spread the word to each other that the meeting would be held in front of the Council, and they gathered there in quite large numbers. Many men were there too, some hoping a delegate from Bucharest would arrive by car so they could talk to him. As the Securitate agent reports, there was a clear intention to push the women to the front. The head of the militia post withdrew into the Council building and drew the shutters, as the women shouted at him to leave the building open.
Another telephone note of 20 November 1962, 4 a.m. (FD II, f. 213-214), speaks of several groups of people who gathered near the People's Council, "shouting against the collective farm of Domașnea". On the report of the militia post, the Securitate, accompanied by party and Militia officials, went to the scene "advising people to go home, as their attitude was contrary to the laws of the state". The people did not seem much intimidated.
In the investigations that followed, one of the women questioned gave the number of 2,000 people present at the meeting (a figure that seems exaggerated; it was probably 200-300, as some of those I interviewed say) and, under interrogation, named whom she had stood next to at the meeting. The Securitate's notes confirm the scale the investigation took and reveal its harsh procedures, but also further details about the meeting. Some were said to have stirred up the women, others to have shouted: "Stay here, don't leave!" A woman, Solomia lui Purec, fell down after pulling at the door.
The Securitate rarely mentions the practical consequences of its reports. In many cases, such as that of Sofia Românu, who, thanks also to the standing she had in the village as a keener (a professional mourner), came to the fore in the revolt of November 1962, arrest followed.
In any case, in 1963 the situation remained tense, and people began to realise that those in Bucharest backed the collective farm's management (cf. note 125.033 of 8 January 1963). In 1964 turnout for work was poor, animal mortality was high again, organisation was bad and productivity low. In May 1965, 54 collective farmers submitted requests to leave.
The report of 12 May 1965 (FD I, f. 140) by Timircan, promoted in the meantime from captain to major, gives one pause. It is a kind of summary report and seems to suggest that the activist Toma and his boss at the district party committee, the district first secretary Dănilă Pușcaș (replaced in the meantime), were not only solely responsible for the abuses and repression that dominated collectivisation in Domașnea, but had also initiated them.
Denouncing the party leadership as the only culprit, despite the evidence, shows that after the death of Gheorghiu-Dej (in March 1965), probably older tensions between the two levers of power came to light, and that the role of judge of the facts, the lasting arbiter of communist power, would still be the Securitate, which even after 1989 would plead its honourability and its wholly patriotic character.
(The research behind this article was carried out within the project "The Collectivisation of Romania, 1949-1964", led by Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery.)
1. This refers to the consolidation of land, through which peasants who had not joined the collective lost the good land near the village and received bad land in exchange, far from the village (cf. also interview 4).
Who steals with the sack, the devil takes him
Who steals with the scythe, the farm forgives him
Who steals by the lorry
The district forgives him
(attributed to Sofia Românu, known as Marcioane).